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Abstract—We study the problem of data disclosure with
privacy guarantees, wherein the utility of the disclosed data
is ensured via a hard distortion constraint. Unlike average
distortion, hard distortion provides a deterministic guarantee of
fidelity. For the privacy measure, we use a tunable information
leakage measure, namely maximal α-leakage (α ∈ [1,∞]), and
formulate the privacy-utility tradeoff problem. The resulting
solution highlights that under a hard distortion constraint, the
nature of the solution remains unchanged for both local and non-
local privacy requirements. More precisely, we show that both
the optimal mechanism and the optimal tradeoff are invariant
for any α > 1; i.e., the tunable leakage measure only behaves
as either of the two extrema, i.e., mutual information for α = 1
and maximal leakage for α =∞.
Index Terms—Privacy-utility tradeoff, maximal α-leakage,
hard distortion, f -divergence.
I. INTRODUCTION
From social networks to medical databases, useful cloud-
based services require some form of user data disclosure to
a third party. Data disclosure, however, often incurs a privacy
risk. In most non-trivial settings, there is a fundamental trade-
off between privacy and utility: on the one hand, disclosing
data “as is” can lead to unwanted inferences of private infor-
mation. On the other hand, perturbing or limiting the disclosed
data can result in a reduced quality of service.
The exact nature of the privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) will
depend to varying degrees on the distribution of the under-
lying data, as well as the chosen metrics (e.g., differential
privacy [1], mutual information (MI) [2], [3], f -divergence-
based leakage measures [4], maximal leakage (MaxL) [5]).
Furthermore, most information-theoretic PUTs capture utility
as a statistical average of desired measures of fidelity [6]–[9].
This, in turn, simplifies the PUT to a single-letter optimization
for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) datasets [10].
We measure utility in terms of a new hard distortion metric,
which constrains the privacy mechanism so that the distortion
function between original and released datasets is bounded
with probability 1. This distortion metric is quite stringent, par-
ticularly when compared to average-case distortion constraints
[10], but it has the advantage that it allows the data curator to
make specific, deterministic guarantees on the fidelity of the
disclosed dataset to the original one. This differs significantly
from a probabilistic constraint, which does not allow the data
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curator to make any guarantee that the realization of the
disclosed dataset has any relationship to the original one.
We adopt maximal α-leakage, which we introduced in [11],
as an information leakage measure. Maximal α-leakage is a
tunable privacy metric defined via an α-loss function with
parameter α ∈ [1,∞]. For α = 1, this metric captures the
inference gain by a (soft decision) belief-refining adversary
after observing the disclosed data. As α → ∞, this metric
captures the reduction in 0 − 1 loss or, equivalently, the
gain of a (hard decision) adversary’s guessing ability after
data disclosure. These extreme points correspond to MI and
MaxL, respectively. The tunable parameter α allows continu-
ous interpolation between the two extremal adversarial actions
by determining how much weight an adversary gives to its
posterior belief.
Using the aforementioned utility and privacy measures, we
precisely quantify the PUT and show that: (i) the same privacy
mechanism achieves the same optimal PUT for all α > 1,
and both the optimal mechanism and the optimal PUT are
independent of the distribution of original data; (ii) For α = 1,
the optimal privacy mechanism depends on the distribution of
original data. More generally, for the sake of completeness, we
also consider a larger class of f -divergence-based information
leakages and derive the optimal PUTs for this class.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we review
maximal α-leakage. In Sec. III, we formulate and solve the
PUT problems with maximal α-leakage as well as its f -
divergence-based variants as privacy measures, and using hard
distortion as the utility measure. In Sec. IV, we illustrate our
results via an example with binary data wherein the distortion
function is the distance between types (empirical distributions)
of the original and disclosed datasets.
II. MAXIMAL α-LEAKAGE AND RELATED LEAKAGE
MEASURES
Let X and Y represent the original and disclosed data,
respectively, and let U represent an arbitrary (potentially
random) function of X that the adversary (a curious or
malicious observer of the disclosed data Y ) is interested in
learning. Maximal α-leakage, introduced in [11], measures
various aspects of leakage (ranging from the probability of
correctly guessing to the posteriori distribution) about data U
from the disclosed Y . We review the formal definition next.
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Definition 1 ([11, Def. 5]). Given a joint distribution PXY
on finite alphabets X ×Y , the maximal α-leakage from X to
Y is defined as
Lmaxα (X → Y )
, sup
U−X−Y
lim
α′→α
α′
α′−1 log
max
P
Uˆ|Y
E
(
P(U=Uˆ |U,Y )
α′−1
α′
)
max
P
Uˆ
E
(
P(U=Uˆ |U)
α′−1
α′
) , (1)
where α ∈ [1,∞], U represents any function of X and takes
values from an arbitrary finite alphabet.
Given an α-loss function, α ∈ (1,∞),
`α(u, y, PUˆ |Y ) ,
α
α− 1
(
1− PUˆ |Y (u|y)1−
1
α
)
, (2)
in the limits of α = 1 and α =∞ we obtain the log-loss and
the 0-1 loss functions, respectively. A related α-gain function
of (2) is 1 − α−1α `α. Therefore, maximal α-leakage in (1)
measures the maximal multiplicative increase in the expected
α-gain for correctly inferring any function U of X when an
adversary has access to Y [11]. The expression in (1) can be
further simplified to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([11, Thm. 2]). For α ∈ [1,∞], the maximal α-
leakage defined in (1) simplifies to
Lmaxα (X → Y )
=
{
sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Dα(PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ), α ∈ (1,∞] (3a)
I(X;Y ), α = 1 (3b)
where in the supremum PX˜ is constrained to have the same
support as X , and Dα(·) is the Re´nyi divergence [12] of order
α given by
Dα(PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ) =
1
α− 1 log
(∑
xy
PX˜(x)PY |X(y|x)α
QY (y)α−1
)
and it is defined by its continuous extension for α = 1 or ∞.
The infimum over QY in (3a) is exactly Sibson MI of order
α [13, Def. 4]. Note that for α = 1 and α =∞, the maximal
α-leakage simplifies to MI and MaxL, respectively. In [11],
we show that maximal α-leakage (α ∈ [1,∞]) satisfies data
processing inequalities and a composition theorem.
While we are mainly interested in maximal α-leakage, our
results apply to a broader class of information leakages derived
from f -divergences. Recall that for a convex function f : R→
R such that f(1) = 0, an f -divergence Df is a measure of
the similarity between two distributions given by
Df (P‖Q) =
∫
dQf
(
dP
dQ
)
. (4)
Definition 2. Given a joint distribution PXY = PY |XPX
and a f -divergence Df , a distribution-dependent leakage is
defined as
Lf (X;Y ) = inf
QY
Df (PXY ‖PX ×QY ), (5)
and a distribution-independent1 leakage is defined as
Lmaxf (X → Y ) = sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ), (6)
where PX˜ is constrained to have the same support as PX .
Recall that for α = 1, the maximal α-leakage is MI and
is a special case of Lf (X;Y ) in (5) with f(t) = t log t.
Furthermore, for α > 1, maximal α-leakage has a one-to-
one relationship with a special case of Lmaxf in (6) for f given
by
fα(t) =
1
α− 1(t
α − 1), (7)
such that Df is the Hellinger divergence of order α [14]. The
following lemma makes precise this observation.
Lemma 1. For α > 1, maximal α-leakage can be written as
Lmaxα (X → Y ) = 1α−1 log
(
1 + (α− 1)Lmaxfα (X → Y )
)
, (8)
where Lmaxfα (X → Y ) is the Lmaxf (X → Y ) in (6) for fα given
by (7) such that Df is the Hellinger divergence of order α.
III. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF WITH A HARD
DISTORTION CONSTRAINT
We now consider PUT problems minimizing either maximal
α-leakage or its related f -divergence-based variants in Def. 2,
subject to a hard distortion constraint. Such a constraint can be
written as d(X,Y ) ≤ D with probability 1, where d(·, ·) is a
distortion function and D is the maximal permitted distortion.
In other words, for any input x ∈ X , the output y of the
privacy mechanism must lie in a ball BD(x) given by
BD(x) , {y : d(x, y) ≤ D}. (9)
We henceforth denote an optimal PUT as PUTHD,L∗∗ , where
HD and L∗∗ in the subscript indicate the utility and privacy
measures, respectively. The following two theorems char-
acterize PUTHD,Lf and PUTHD,Lmaxf with detailed proofs in
appendices A and B, respectively.
Theorem 2. For any distribution-dependent leakage Lf in (5)
and a distortion function d(·, ·) with BD(x) in (9), the optimal
PUT is given by
PUTHD,Lf (D)
= inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lf (X;Y )
=f(0) + inf
QY
E
(
QY (BD(X))
(
f
(
1
QY (BD(X))
)− f(0))).
(10)
(11)
If there exists a distribution Q?Y achieving the infimum in
(11), an optimal mechanism P ∗Y |X is given by
dP ∗Y |X=x
dQ?Y
(y) =
1
(
d(x, y) ≤ D)
Q?Y (BD(x))
. (12)
1The independence is with respect to the distribution of X . This
“distribution-independent” measure depends on the distribution of X only
through its support. In contrast, the distribution-dependent measure Lf
depends fully on the distribution of X . Both measures depend on the chosen
mechanism PY |X .
0 0 1
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0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0
1
1
Fig. 1: An optimal mechanism for α > 1 with (n,m) = (8, 2).
Note that the hard distortion forces conditional probabilities of
outputs outside the feasible ball of a given input to be zero.
We highlight the conditional probabilities of feasible outputs
in green, and give their values in the optimal mechanism.
Theorem 3. For any distribution-independent leakage Lmaxf in
(6), a distortion function d(·, ·) and BD(x) in (9), the optimal
PUT is given by
PUTHD,Lmaxf (D) = infPY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lmaxf (X → Y )
=q?f((q?)−1) + (1− q?)f(0),
(13)
(14)
with q∗ defined as
q? , sup
QY
inf
x
QY (BD(x)). (15)
Moreover, if there exists Q?Y achieving the supremum in (15),
an optimal mechanism P ∗Y |X is given by (12).
The PUTs in (11) and (14) simplify to finding an output
distribution QY that can be viewed as a “target” distribution,
i.e., the optimal mechanism aims to produce this distribution
as closely as possible, subject to the utility constraint. In
particular, the resulting optimal mechanism (derived from
(12)), for any input, distributes the outputs according to QY
while conditioning the output to be within a ball of radius D
about the input. The optimization in (15) ensures that all inputs
are uniformly masked while (11) provides average guarantees.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal tradeoff
PUTHD,Lmaxα for maximal α-leakage. Recall that for α = 1,Lmax1 equals Lf with f(t) = t log t. For α > 1, from the one-
to-one relationship between Lmaxα and Lmaxfα in (8), we know
that finding PUTHD,Lmaxα is equivalent to finding the optimal
tradeoff PUTHD,Lmaxf in (13) for Lmaxf = Lmaxfα . Due to space
constraints, we omit details.
Theorem 4. For maximal α-leakage Lmaxα , a distortion func-
tion d(·, ·) and BD(x) in (9), the optimal PUT is given by
PUTHD,Lmaxα (D) = infPY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Lmaxα (X → Y ) (16)
=
{
inf
QY
E
(
log 1QY (BD(X))
)
, α = 1 (17a)
− log q?, α > 1 (17b)
where q? is defined in (15). Moreover, an optimal mechanism
is given by (12), where for α = 1, Q?Y achieves the infimum
in (17a); and for α > 1, Q?Y achieves the supremum in (15).
Remark 1. Note that subject to a hard distortion constraint,
the optimal privacy mechanism is always given by (12). In
particular, for maximal α-leakage, the optimal mechanism as
well as the optimal PUT are identical for all α > 1.
IV. EXAMPLE: HARD DISTORTION FOR BINARY TYPES
When considering dataset disclosure under privacy con-
straints, a reasonable goal is to design privacy mechanisms that
preserve the statistics of the original dataset while preventing
inference of each individual record (e.g., a sample or a row of
the dataset). Since the type (empirical distribution) of a dataset
captures its statistics, we quantify distortion as the distance
between the type of the original and disclosed datasets. We
use maximal α-leakage to capture the gain of an adversary
(with access to the disclosed dataset) in inferring any function
of the original dataset.
Let Xn be a random dataset with n entries and Y n be
the corresponding disclosed dataset generated by a privacy
mechanism PY n|Xn . Entries of both Xn and Y n are from
the same alphabet X . For a pair of input and output datasets
(xn, yn) of PY n|Xn , let Pxn and Pyn indicate the types,
respectively. We define the distortion function as
d(xn, yn) = max
x∈X
|Pxn(x)− Pyn(x)|, (18)
and therefore, obtain PUTHD,Lmaxα as in (16) but with datasets
Xn, Y n in place of single letters X,Y . Let the fraction mn
(m ∈ [0, n]) be the upper bound D in (16), where [0, n]
indicates the set of integers from 0 to n.
We concentrate on binary datasets and let X = {0, 1}. Note
that for binary datasets, we can simply write d(xn, yn) =
|Pxn(0)−Pyn(0)|. For a n-length binary dataset, the number
of types is n+1. Therefore, all input and output datasets can
be categorized into n+ 1 type classes defined as
T (i) , {xn : nPxn(0) = i} = {yn : nPyn(0) = i}, i ∈ [0, n].
Theorem 5. Given an arbitrary pair of (n,m) ∈ [1,∞) ×
[0, n], the minimal leakage for α > 1 is
PUTHD,Lmaxα
(m
n
)
= log
⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉
. (19)
An optimal privacy mechanism maps all input datasets in a
type class to a unique output dataset which is feasible and
belongs to a type class in the set T ∗ given by
T ∗ ,
{
T (j) : j=l+(2m+1)k, k ∈ [0,d n+12m+1e−1]
}
, (20)
where l = m if m +
(
d n+12m+1e − 1
)
(2m + 1) ≤ n, and
otherwise, l = n−
(
d n+12m+1e − 1
)
(2m+ 1).
A detailed proof is in Appendix C. Let (n,m) = (8, 2)
such that from Thm. 5, we have T ∗ = {T (2), T (7)}. Fig. 1
shows the optimal mechanism, which maps all input datasets
in {T (i) : i ∈ [0, 4]} (resp. {T (i) : i ∈ [5, 8]}) to a unique
output dataset in T (2) (resp. T (7)) with probability 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have explored PUTs in the context of hard distortion
utility constraints. This utility constraint has the advantage
that it allows the data curator to make specific, deterministic
guarantees on the quality of the published dataset. Focusing on
maximal α-leakage and its f -divergence-based variants, under
a hard distortion constraint, we have shown that: (i) for all
α > 1, we obtain the same optimal privacy mechanism and
optimal PUT, which are independent of the distribution of
the original data (or datasets); (ii) for α = 1, the optimal
mechanism differs and depends on the distribution of the
original data (or data sets). In other words, for this distortion
measure, the tunable privacy measure behaves as either MI
or MaxL. Possible future directions include verifying whether
the observed behavior holds for average distortion constraints
and more complicated data models.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
The feasible ball BD(x) around x is defined in (9). For the
distribution dependent PUT in (10), we have
PUTHD,Lf (D)
= inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
inf
QY
Df (PY |XPX‖PX ×QY ) (21)
=inf
QY
inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
∫
dPXDf (PY |X=x‖QY ) (22)
=inf
QY
∫
dPX inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
∫
dQY f
(
dPY |X(·|x)
dQY
)
(23)
=inf
QY
∫
dPX inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
 ∫
y∈BD(x)c
dQY f
(
dPY |X(·|x)
dQY
)
+QY (BD(x))
∫
y∈BD(x)
dQY
QY (BD(x))
f
(
dPY |X(·|x)
dQY
)
≥inf
QY
∫
dPX inf
PY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x)
c) f(0)
+QY (BD(x))f
(
1
QY (BD(x))
))
(24)
=f(0) + inf
QY
∫
dPX
(
QY (BD(x))
(
f
( 1
QY (BD(x))
)− f(0)))
where
• (22) follows from the fact that Df (PY |X‖QY |PX) is
convex in (PY |X , QY ) for fixed PX ,
• (24) is from the Jensen’s inequality and the equality holds
if and only if there is a mechanism PY |X satisfying
dPY |X(y|x)
dQY (y)
=
1(y ∈ BD(x))
QY (BD(x))
. (25)
B. Proof of Theorem 3
The feasible ball BD(x) around x is defined in (9). For the
distribution independent PUT in (13), we have
PUTHD,Lmaxf (D)
= inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
sup
PX˜
inf
QY
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ) (26)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
inf
PY |X :d(X,Y )≤D
Df (PX˜PY |X‖PX˜ ×QY ) (27)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
inf
PY |X
d(X,Y )≤D
∫ (
dPX˜(x)Df (PY |X=x‖QY )
)
(28)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∫
dPX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
∫
dQY f
(
dPY |X=x
dQY
)
(29)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∫
dPX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(∫
BD(x)
dQY
f
(
dPY |X=x
dQY
)
+
∫
BD(x)c
dQY f(0)
)
(30)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∫
dPX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x))
∫
BD(x)
dQY
QY (BD(x))
f
(
dPY |X=x
dQY
)
+QY (BD(x)
c)f(0)
)
(31)
≥inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∫
dPX˜(x) infPY |X=x
Y ∈BD(x)
(
QY (BD(x))
·f
(
1
QY (BD(x))
)
+
(
1−QY (BD(x))
)
f(0)
)
(32)
=inf
QY
sup
PX˜
∫
dPX˜(x) g
(
QY (BD(x))
)
(33)
=inf
QY
sup
x
g
(
QY (BD(x))
)
(34)
where
• (27) and (29) follow from the fact that Df (PXY ‖PX ×
QY ) is linear in PX for fixed (PY |X , QY ) and convex in
(PY |X , QY ) for fixed PX ,
• (32) follows from the convexity of f and Jensen’s in-
equality. The equality holds if and only if there exists a
mechanism PY |X satisfying (25).
• (33) results from q , QY (BD(x)) and
g(q) , qf(q−1) + (1− q)f(0). (35)
Due to the convexity of f , we have f(q−1) − f(0) ≤
f ′(q−1)
(
q−1 − 0), from which, the derivative g′(q) =
f(q−1) − q−1f ′(q−1) − f(0) ≤ 0. Therefore, the function
g in (35) is non-increasing, such that (34) is be simplified as
g(q?), where q∗ is given by
q? , sup
QY
inf
x
QY (BD(x)). (36)
C. Proof of Theorem 5
Define the feasible ball around an input dataset xn as
BD(x
n) ,
{
yn : |Pxn(0)− Pyn(0)| ≤ m
n
}
. (37)
From Thm. 4, to find an optimal mechanism P ∗Y n|Xn , we need
to find an output distribution Q∗Y n which optimizes (15) with
xn and yn in place of x, y.
Note that for the hard distortion |Pxn(0) − Pyn(0)| ≤ mn , all
datasets in a type class share the same group of feasible output
datasets, and this feasible group can be represented by the type
classes. Therefore, for any xn ∈ T (i) (i ∈ [0, n]), we rewrite
BD(x
n) as
BD(x
n) = BD(T (i)) , {T (j) : |i− j| ≤ m, j ∈ [0, n]} .
We define an distribution QT of type classes for outputs as
QT (j) ,
∑
yn∈T (j)
QY n(y
n), for j ∈ [1, n], (38)
such that
q∗ = sup
QT
inf
i∈[0,n]
QT (BD(T (i))). (39)
The optimal distribution QT is determined by both upper and
lower bounding q∗ in (39). The upper bound is determined by
restricting the optimization in (39) to a judicious choice of a
small set of input types. The lower bound is a constructive
scheme. Let l = m+(2m+1)
(
d n+12m+1e − 1
)
−n. We define
an index set IT ⊂ [0, n] for types as
IT ,

{
m+ (2m+ 1)k : k ∈
[
0,
⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉
− 1
]}
l ≤ 0{
l + (2m+ 1)k : k ∈
[
0,
⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉
− 1
]}
l > 0
. (40)
From the expression of IT in (40), we observe that: (i) for
l ≤ 0 (resp. l > 0), the first (resp. last) element is m (resp.
n); (ii) for l ≤ 0 (resp. l > 0), the last (resp. first) element
is no less (resp. less) than n−m (resp. m+ 1); (iii) for both
cases, the difference between adjacent elements is 2m + 1.
Therefore, it is not difficult to see that feasible balls of input
type classes indexed by IT are a partition of the set of all type
classes, i.e.,
BD(T (i1)) ∩BD(T (i2)) = ∅ i1, i2 ∈ IT ,
{T (j) : j ∈ [0, n]} =
⋃
i∈IT
BD(T (i)).
(41a)
(41b)
Therefore, the problem in (39) is upper bounded by
q∗ ≤sup
QT
inf
i∈IT
QT (BD(T (i))) (42)
≤ sup
QT
1
|IT |
∑
i∈IT
QT (BD(T (i))) (43)
= sup
QT
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1 ∑
j∈[1,n]
QT (T (j)) (44)
=
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
. (45)
Construct an distribution Q′T as
Q′T (j) =
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
for j ∈ IT , (46)
and otherwise, Q′T (j) = 0. By (41) for each i ∈ [0, n], there
is a unique k satisfying |i− IT (k)| ≤ m, where IT (k) is the
kth element2 of IT . Therefore, we lower bound (39) by
q∗ ≥ inf
i
Q′T (BD(T (i))) (47)
= inf
i
Q′T
( ⋃
|i−j|≤m
j∈IT
T (j)
)
(48)
= inf
k
Q′T (T (IT (k))) =
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
. (49)
Thus, q∗ =
(⌈
n+1
2m+1
⌉)−1
and the Q′T in (46) is optimal.
From (38) and the Q′T , we derive an optimal Q
∗
Y n , which
assigns the same non-zero probability to only one dataset of
each type classes indexed by IT , i.e., Q∗Y n(y
n) = q∗ for one
yn ∈ T (j) for each j ∈ IT . Therefore, from (12) we have
the corresponding optimal privacy mechanism, which maps all
input datasets in one input type class to one feasible output
dataset with probability 1.
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